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ARTICLES
RECONCILING STRICT LIABILITY WITH

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN CONTRACT LAW
Curtis Bridgeman*
INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades scholars of justice theories have produced a
revival in tort law. According to corrective-justice theorists, tort law is best
explained entirely as a form of compensation for harms done by one
individual to another. In their view, encouraging or deterring certain kinds
of conduct are legitimate public-policy goals, but they have nothing to do
with the justice of private law. They believe that tort law, and private law
generally, are exclusively concerned with justice between individuals, or
what Aristotle called "what is just in men's dealings with one another."' In
this view, tort law can be explained entirely by the duty of injurers to
compensate victims for their wrongful conduct, irrespective of what is best
for society as a whole. Moreover, for nearly all corrective-justice theorists,
this duty to repair is a moral obligation grounded in the fact that an innocent
2
victim has suffered a harm as a result of an injurer's wrongdoing.
More recently, some thinkers have begun to apply corrective-justice
theory to contract law as well. 3 But so far none of these early forays has
* James Edmund and Margaret Elizabeth Hennessey Corry Professor of Law, Florida State
University College of Law. Many thanks to those who commented on earlier drafts or
provided helpful discussion on these topics, including Brian Bix, Alan Calnan, Richard
Craswell, Claire Finkelstein, Richard Gerberding, John Goldberg, Greg Keating, Jody Kraus,
Daniel Markovits, Dennis Patterson, Bob Rasmussen, Bob Scott, Ben Zipursky, and the
participants of the 2005 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum. Apologies to those
accidentally left off of this list.
1. Aristotle, Politics, reprinted in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised
Oxford Translation 1986, 2108 (Jonathan Barnes ed., B. Jowett trans., 1984).
2. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 19, 134 (1995) [hereinafter
Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law]; Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between
Corrective and DistributiveJustice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series 237,
247, 262 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in

Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 159, 160 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
3. See, e.g., Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 136-40; Peter Benson,
Contract,in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 24 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996); Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justificationfor Contract, 33 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 273 (1995) [hereinafter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justificationfor
Contract]; Peter Benson, The Philosophy of Property Law, in The Oxford Handbook of

Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 752 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
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dealt with a potentially embarrassing problem for anyone who would apply
corrective-justice theory to contract: The doctrines of contract law do not
seem to be concerned with wrongdoing at all. While tort law is centered on
wrongdoing by individuals, whether intentional or negligent, contract law
has a strict-liability standard of fault. Contracting parties are not expected
merely to use their best efforts to perform, or even to use the best efforts
that a reasonable person would use. Instead, they are simply expected to
perform, and, if they do not do so, contract doctrine is generally
uninterested in their reasons for not doing so, including reasons that might
excuse them from a moral obligation to perform. Likewise, courts are
equally uninterested in evidence that a party could have performed and
chose not to for vicious reasons, as evidenced by the lack of a punitive
damages remedy in contract. In short, it seems odd to say that contract law
is a matter of corrective justice when contract doctrine does not ask any of
the questions we typically ask about potentially wrongful behavior.
This Article examines how corrective-justice theory may explain the
structure of contract law despite its lack of interest in the wrongfulness of
breach in individual cases. The key is to understand, first of all, that some
of the theories typically lumped together under the label of "corrective
justice" differ in important ways. Most importantly for our purposes,
corrective-justice theorists disagree about whether private law is, at its most
fundamental level, focused on wrongdoing by the defendant or on a loss or
other claim by the plaintiff. Although the term "corrective justice" is
typically associated with the former, in other words with views that focus
primarily on wrongdoing by the defendant, the latter group presents a
powerful view that is distinct in a seemingly subtle yet crucial way. In
particular, so-called "allocative" versions of corrective justice provide for
the possibility that losses can be wrongful without being the result of
wrongdoing, and that it is the aim of tort law to deal with such losses. My
thesis is that by understanding corrective justice in such a way, we can
make sense of contract law as a form of corrective justice despite its nofault standard of liability. In particular, we should resist the temptation to
think of contract law as addressing the wrongdoing of breaching a contract.
Instead, contract law seeks to correct for the frustration of entitlements to
performance, entitlements created at the time of contracting, and is
generally indifferent to the wrongfulness of breach itself.
The Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will briefly review the
early application of corrective justice theory to contract law. In Part II, I
[hereinafter Benson, The Philosophy of Property Law]; Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract

Law, in The Theory of Contract Law 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter Benson, The
Unity of Contract Law]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract

Remedies, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 55 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib, Punishment and
Disgorgement as ContractRemedies]; Peter Benson, The Expectation and Reliance Interests
in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Purdue, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 2001,
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context-ils [hereinafter Benson,
A Reply to Fuller and Perdue]; see also Curtis Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in Contract
Law: Is There a Casefor Punitive Damages?, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 237 (2003).
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will explain the division in tort theory among corrective-justice theorists
between those who focus on wrongdoing and those who focus on wrongful
loss. I will show that this dispute is not simply semantic hairsplitting, but
rather reveals an important difference in approaches toward the goals of
private law. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that regardless of which camp
is correct about tort law, the "allocative" or "entitlement" theorists-those
who focus on the wrongfulness of loss irrespective of the presence of
wrongdoing-have (unwittingly, as it turns out) described the structure of
contract law quite nicely. In Part III, I will review a few features of
contract doctrine to illustrate how seeing contract law as protecting
entitlements created at the time of contracting, rather than as addressing the
moral wrongdoing of breach, explains much of our contract doctrine quite
well. On the other hand, there is one doctrinal area that at first glance may
seem to be a counterexample:
the doctrine of impossibility or
impracticability of performance, which I will discuss in Part IV. Although
it may seem at first that the doctrine of impossibility/impracticability
reveals a fault standard implicit in contract law by allowing parties an
excuse for their nonperformance in situations where they would be morally
excused, I will show that, properly understood, this doctrine actually
reinforces rather than undermines the idea that contract law is best
understood as correcting for the frustration of entitlements rather than as
addressing the wrongfulness of breach. This Article will briefly conclude
by pointing out important work that still remains for those who would apply
corrective-justice theory to contract law.
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, CONTRACT LAW, AND WRONGDOING

Most of the discussion of corrective justice in contract law so far has
focused on a decades-old challenge to the very possibility of a correctivejustice account of contract law. In what is undoubtedly the most famous
law review article written on contract damages, Lon Fuller and William
Purdue argued that contract law must be a matter of distributive justice
rather than corrective justice because of its entrenched remedy of
expectation damages. 4 Since expectation damages seek to place the nonbreaching party in the position she would have been in had the contract
been performed, even if that amount exceeds the costs she actually incurred
in relying on the contract, Fuller and Purdue argued that such damages
could not be merely compensatory. And since corrective justice seeks to go
no further than compensation for losses suffered, the expectancy remedy
must be justified, if at all, either as an indirect way of paying reliance
damages or as serving some other purpose, such as distributive justice.

4. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pts. 1 & 2), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
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Ernest Weinrib 5 and Peter Benson, 6 the two leading corrective-justice
theorists to address its application to contract law, separately try to meet
Fuller and Purdue's challenge. Both argue that expectation damages are, in
fact, compensatory and therefore fall under corrective justice, but not
because they compensate for reliance damages. Rather, they argue that
when a promisor breaches, the promisee is denied something to which she
has a right. Weinrib and Benson disagree as to what exactly that right isfor Weinrib it is a right to the promisor's performance 7 while for Benson, it
is a property right in the thing bargained for itself, at least as against the
promisor. 8 But both argue that the promisee gains a right at the time of
contracting such that the promisor's failure to perform causes the promisee
a loss. Expectation damages appropriately compensate for this loss, and, as
we have noted, compensation for loss lies at the very core of theories of
corrective justice.
A problem remains, however. For even if one of these explanations of
the compensatory nature of contract law is correct, neither Weinrib nor
Benson has adequately explained why the promisor must compensate for
the loss suffered by the promisee when the law holds promisors strictly
liable for breach, that is, liable regardless of any consideration of fault on
the promisor's part. 9 To be sure, if their accounts are correct, each breach
of promise constitutes the impairment of a right in the promisee that
provides good grounds for a claim against the promisor. But Weinrib, at
least, has repeatedly and forcefully insisted that the application of corrective
justice requires not just a violation of the victim's rights but also a
wrongdoing on the part of the injurer.' 0 For Weinrib, wrongfulness is
"fully relational"; one only suffers a wrongful loss if the injurer is guilty of
wrongdoing." Yet it is hard to see how liability for breach of contract

5. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 136-40; Weinrib, Punishmentand
Disgorgementas ContractRemedies, supra note 3, at 62-70.
6. Benson, A Reply to Fuller andPerdue, supra note 3.

7. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as ContractRemedies, supra note 3, at 6470.
8. Benson, A Reply to Fuller and Perdue, supra note 3, at 35-41; Benson, The
Philosophy of PropertyLaw, supra note 3, at 782-83.

9. Peter Benson argues that "the mere failure to perform may reasonably be viewed as a
wrongful retention of the thing, that is, as a wrongful taking possession of it." Peter Benson,
The Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 3, at 797. Such retention is per se wrongful,
Benson argues, because of the rights to performance created at the time of contract. Benson
is on the right track by treating contractual entitlements as analogous to property rights
(indeed, Benson goes further and treats them as a species of property rights), but he does not
explain why it is that a failure to perform is necessarily wrongful (as contrasted with an
infringement of any other property right). That is, he does not explain how it is that in some
cases the failure to perform, although actionable, can clearly be justified from a moral point
of view. It is one thing to say that violations of rights to performance are per se actionable,
another to say they are per se wrongful.
10. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 120-26; Ernest J. Weinrib, NonRelationalRelationships: A Note on Coleman's New Theory, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (1992)

[hereinafter Weinrib, Non-RelationalRelationships].
11. Weinrib, Non-RelationalRelationships,supra note 10.
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requires wrongdoing when the standard is strict liability. 12 Under our strictliability regime, a breach alone suffices for liability regardless of whether
the breaching party was justified-morally or otherwise-in breaching.
There simply is no inquiry into wrongdoing or justification.
At first glance, it may seem that the presence of wrongdoing in breachof-contract cases goes without saying, at least for any noneconomic theory
of contract law. When we say of someone that she has breached, it sounds
prima facie as if we are accusing her of wrongdoing. 13 Indeed, the
challenge for some prominent justice theorists has been to explain not why
contracts are binding, but rather why only some promises are legally
binding contracts while others are not. 14 In this respect, there seems to be
too much moral justification on hand for the enforcement of promises.
Despite the prima facie wrongfulness of failing to keep promises, the law
is generally not concerned with judging wrongfulness in breaches of
contract. This lack of concern is evident in two ways. First, courts do not
inquire into the justifiability of breach in a given case: Defendants are not
allowed to defend on the grounds of a lack of wrongdoing. According to
the Second Restatement of Contracts,
Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim thatpactasunt
servanda, contracts are to be kept. The obligor is therefore liable in
damages for breach of contract even if he is without fault and even if
circumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable
than he had anticipated.15
The Second Restatement does go on to consider when "extraordinary
circumstances" might warrant a departure from this rule. 16 I would argue
that even these exceptions generally do not presuppose a fault standard, but
even if they did, it is enough for our purposes that they are rare exceptions.
If corrective justice is to explain contract law, it must be able to account for
the fact that, as a general matter, the law does not inquire into the
justifiability of breach.
Secondly, the law is equally unconcerned with how willful and deliberate
the breach may have been. Except in rare cases, courts are uninterested in
whether the promisor could have performed and simply chose not to. It is a
12. One intriguing possibility recently offered is that contract law does not really contain
a strict-liability standard at all. See Stephen A. Smith, Contract Theory 376-86 (2004).
Though that explanation would certainly make things easier for the corrective-justice
theories of contract, for various reasons that I am unable to catalog here, I find it
unpersuasive. For one quick response, see infra note 22.
13. Ernest Weinrib seems just to assume that breach of contract satisfies the wrongdoing
element. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
14. For an account that grounds contract theory in the moral obligation to keep promises,
see Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981). For the
criticism that Charles Fried's view is incapable of distinguishing promises that are legally
binding from those that are not, see Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at
121.
15. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 11, introductory note, at 309 (1981).
16. Id. at 310.
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well-established principle of contract law that punitive damages are not
awarded for breach of contract, even if the breach is willful and
deliberate. 17 Most states recognize a cause of action for a bad-faith breach
of contract in insurance contexts, but those claims sound in tort, and, in any
case, are now limited to insurance contexts only. 18 In short, neither
plaintiffs nor defendants get the benefit of an inquiry into the justifiability
of the promisor's breach.
The challenge to the claim that breach entails wrongdoing predates even
Fuller and Purdue's argument that contract law does distributive, not
corrective, justice. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously claimed that "[tlhe
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must
pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."' 9 Holmes, of
course, did not have corrective-justice theories in particular in mind, but
rather was taking aim at any view that failed to build a wall between
morality and the law. Whatever one thinks of Holmes's version of realism
as a general theory of law, it has been extremely influential in contract law,
especially with respect to strict liability for breach. For example, Holmes is
often cited for the proposition that punitive damages are not awarded in
breach of contract cases no matter the cause of the breach.2 0 And
contemporary economists such as Richard Posner cite Holmes as the
inspiration for the idea that parties are free to breach whenever it is efficient
21
to do so.
Thus, what at first glance might appear to be just conceptual hairsplitting
from within the family of corrective-justice theorists could in fact be far
more significant. If contract law is indifferent to wrongdoing, then it is not
fundamentally concerned with correcting wrongdoing.
Moreover, if
contract law is indifferent to the reasons for breach, then one might
imagine, with Holmes, that it is indifferent to performance altogether so
long as damages are paid. 22 Without moral standards and considerations of
17. See E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 12.8, at 194 (3d ed. 2004).

18. For a brief history of the tort of bad-faith breach of contract, as well as an argument
that Weinrib's account of corrective justice might require an accounting of certain kinds of
wrongdoing in contract, as well as punitive damages, see Bridgeman, supra note 3.
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).

20. For example, a leading contracts treatise quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes: "If a
contract is broken the measure of damages generally is the same, whatever the cause of the
breach." Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 12.8, at 195 (quoting Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton
Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903)).
21. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 131 (5th ed., Aspen Law & Bus.
1998) (1973).

22. Stephen Smith has recently argued that contractual duties are disjunctive, but has
drawn an opposite conclusion from this premise. Smith, supra note 12, at 376-86. Rather
than concluding that contract is not concerned with wrongdoing, he argues that the fact that
promises in contracts are promises either to perform (the primary duty) or to pay damages
(the secondary duty-an important distinction Holmes does not make) shows that there
really is no such thing as strict liability in contract. Id. at 384-86. One may have good
reasons for not performing, but since the only reason for not at least performing the
secondary duty (paying damages) is insolvency then contractual remedies are really based on
a fault standard. Id. Smith's arguments deserve more reply than I can give here, but suffice
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wrongdoing to help decide between performance and nonperformance, the
way may be cleared for economists to fill the void with standards of
efficiency. Corrective justice seems to have nothing to say about contract
law. Indeed, Jules Coleman himself, one of the dons of corrective-justice
market paradigm," his
theory in tort, gives up all of contract theory to "the
23
own rational-choice model of law and economics.
The tension between contract law's indifference to wrongdoing and the
apparent wrongfulness of breach can be reconciled once we appreciate the
fact that saying that we are justified in holding people legally responsible
for their promises and saying that they act wrongfully any time they breach
are two different things. In what follows, I intend to argue that contract law
can and should be conceived as consistent with principles of corrective
justice, but without the standard account of breach as necessarily involving
Whatever its merits in tort theory, the wrongdoing
wrongdoing.
requirement does not apply to breach of contract.
Some prominent corrective-justice accounts explain tort law as a means
of ensuring that the costs of accidents are distributed fairly rather than as a
system for policing wrongdoing by injurers. Jules Coleman, 24 Stephen
Perry,2 5 Arthur Ripstein,2 6 and Tony Honor627 all fall roughly into this
camp, and we can usefully follow John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky in
calling their views "allocative" theories of corrective justice. 2 8 None of
these theorists have had much to say about corrective justice and contract
is
law, however, except for Coleman, who ironically argues that contract
29
best explained by the economic need to create and sustain markets. I will
argue that this is a missed opportunity and that we can profitably describe
the law of contract, perhaps even more so than the law of tort, as correcting
for the frustration of legitimate entitlements and not as policing the
wrongdoing that one may or may not be guilty of when one breaks a
promise.
It is not my aim here to offer an entirely original theory of contract law.
Peter Benson 30 and Randy Barnett 3 ' have already developed what might be
it to say for now that one problem with this argument is that courts will still hold parties
liable for damages even if they are insolvent, and even if they are insolvent for totally
innocent reasons (e.g., as a result of an unforeseeable and uninsurable natural disaster), at
least if anyone bothers to bring a case. Collecting damages will of course be difficult, but
that has nothing to do with contract law. As a matter of law, the breaching parties are liable
for damages regardless of the reasons for their not having paid them.
23. Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 4-6, 105-82 (1992).
24. Id. at 324-26.
25. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof Tort Law, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 506-12
(1992).
26. Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law 3 (1999).
27. Tony Honor6, Responsibility and Fault 73-81 (2002).
28. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 Cornell
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
29. See supra note 23.
30. See Benson, Contract, supra note 3; Benson, A Reply to Fuller and Purdue, supra
note 3; Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justificationfor Contract, supra note 3;
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termed "entitlement" theories of contract, in which contract law is
understood to be concerned with the transfer and protection of property (or
property-like) rights. Although my understanding of contract theory has
been influenced by their work, neither of them has adequately addressed the
question of wrongdoing in contract law. Indeed, their views seem to tend
more toward a fully relational view of wrongful loss than toward the nonrelational account I will lay out here. 32 The difference is of vital
importance for how we make sense of contract law. If, as I will argue, we
conclude that contract law protects entitlements irrespective of the
wrongfulness of the breach, then we are likely to take a very different view
of particular contract issues like impossibility of performance and efficient
breach. We must explain these issues not by the degree of wrongdoing in
the promisor's conduct, but rather by the extent of the non-breaching
party's entitlement and the promisor's corresponding legal duty to perform.
II. WRONGFUL Loss WITHOUT WRONGDOING

Contract law's indifference to wrongdoing threatens to embarrass those
who would argue that contract law can be explained as a form of corrective
justice. According to many theorists, corrective justice aims to correct
moral wrongdoing. Since contract law is not concerned with wrongdoing,
even if we accept a justice-based account, it is not obvious how contract law
could be explained by corrective justice. None of the theories mentioned
above have adequately accounted for the insignificance of wrongdoing in
contract law. It seems that either contract law cannot be explained by
corrective justice or that the fully relational account of corrective justice is
unsuited to explaining contract law.
In what follows, I will argue for the latter. What we need is an account
of corrective justice that seeks to correct losses that are wrongful
irrespective of whether they are the result of wrongdoing. I shall begin by
examining the analogous debate between "relational" and "allocative"
corrective-justice theorists of tort law. In this debate, relationalists argue
that the point and purpose of tort law is to address certain forms of
wrongdoing, and that the wrongful losses addressed by tort law cannot be
understood as wrongful apart from the wrongdoing by the injurer that led to
the loss. By contrast, allocative theorists maintain that tort law is primarily
Benson, The Philosophy of Property Law, supra note 3; Benson, The Unity of ContractLaw,

supra note 3.
31. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986);
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 Va. L.

Rev. 821 (1992) [hereinafter Bamett, The Sound of Silence].
32. Randy Barnett views contract as containing individual moral obligations, seemingly
in line with a Weinribian, fully relational view of wrongful loss and wrongdoing. See
infra,notes 97-119 and accompanying text. Although Benson does not discuss the issue of
wrongdoing in contract law much, he does say that "breach is misfeasance, not
nonfeasance." Benson, A Reply to Fuller and Purdue, supra note 3, at 51. He also makes
clear that in contract law we judge "the promisor's conduct" in reference to his duty to keep
his promises, what Benson calls a "duty of fidelity." Id. at 28.
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concerned with wrongful losses, and wrongdoing is relevant only insofar as
it identifies a particular injurer as responsible for the loss. A consequence
of this view is that a duty to repair can be imposed as a matter of justice on
persons who cause "wrongful" losses without having acted "wrongfully."
A good starting point for us, then, will be to review briefly the debate about
wrongdoing in tort law before returning to contract. Eventually, I will
argue that the allocative view of wrongdoing and corrective justice explains
contract law better than the relational view, even though the allocative
33
theorists have shown no interest in applying their view to contract law.
The most prominent advocate of the allocative view is Jules Coleman.
Coleman's theory starts with the fact that there is a loss in the world whose
cost must be borne by someone. 34 The issue is whether there is some
person other than the victim who, by virtue of his connection to the loss,
should assume it. 35 The fact that a loss is wrongful establishes that a victim
has a right to compensation; the fact that an injurer is responsible in some
appropriate sense for that wrongful loss establishes that he has a duty to
compensate the victim for her wrongful loss. Coleman maintains that
losses can be wrongful whenever rights are infringed by the actions of other
agents, as opposed to, for example, when they are caused by natural
disasters or by one's own mistakes. Injurers have a duty to repair the losses
for which they can be deemed responsible.
What counts as responsibility in tort law is a contentious issue. Coleman,
Perry, Ripstein, and Honor6 all have different accounts of what makes a
particular injurer responsible for the harms she caused. Indeed, in one sense
even Richard Epstein's call for strict liability in tort law falls into this camp:

33. That is not to say that the allocative view provides a better explanation of tort law.
This Article will remain neutral in that debate.
34. Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in Analyzing Law:
New Essays in Legal Theory 257, 302 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) ("Tort law is about messes. A
mess has been made, and the only question before the court is, who is to clean it up?").
35. Jules Coleman originally argued for the "annulment thesis," the view that tort law
essentially concerns the annulment of wrongful losses. See Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 Ind. L.J. 349 (1992). But Weinrib, Stephen Perry,
and others strongly criticized the annulment thesis for its failure to explain a fundamental
feature of our tort-law system, that is the fact that the tortfeasor owes a duty to the victim
that no one else owes. See Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67
Ind. L.J. 381 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law
& Phil. 37, 39 (1983). The fact that the injurer caused the victim a wrongful loss changes
the relationship between the injurer and victim so that the victim has a claim against the
injurer above and beyond the claim he has against society at large. In light of this criticism,
Coleman abandoned his annulment thesis in favor of what he called the "mixed conception
of corrective justice." Coleman, supra note 23, at 311-24. The view was "mixed" in that it
started with the fact that the wrongfulness of loss created an entitlement in the victim to
reparation just as the annulment thesis had, but it went beyond the annulment thesis to
recognize that injurers have a special duty to repair the wrongful losses of their victims that
others do not have. Weinrib still claims that Coleman's "mixed" conception is not relational
enough. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-RelationalRelationships, supra note 10.
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For him, causation alone is enough to make one responsible. 36 But these
debates between the grounds for responsibility in tort law need not plague
us in contract law, since promisors freely assume responsibility by entering
into a contract. Binding contracts create entitlements in the promisee, and
any loss of those entitlements becomes the promisor's responsibility to
repair. It is beyond the scope of this project to explain why contracts create
entitlements, other than to appeal to the widely held intuition that
individuals are generally free to assume obligations if they so desire.
Instead, my aim here is to show how a consent theory of contract can be
consistent both with principles of corrective justice and with contract law's
indifference to wrongdoing.
The leading proponent of the relational view of corrective justice is
Ernest Weinrib. 37 Weinrib argues that corrective justice is essentially
concerned with correcting wrongs rather than allocating losses per se. The
relational view starts with the voluntary action of the wrongdoer rather than
with the victim's wrongful loss. According to this account, when agents are
guilty of wrongdoing (e.g., by being careless in a way that fails to respect
the rights of others), corrective justice requires them to make good the
harmful consequences of their wrongful act by repairing the losses their
wrongdoing caused. For Weinrib, wrongfulness is fully relational: The
wrongfulness of the loss can only result from wrongdoing by the tortfeasor.
The injurer and victim are inextricably linked in a "bipolar" 3 8 relation as
"doer and sufferer of the same harm." 39 Without wrongdoing, the loss is by
definition not wrongful. 40 For Weinrib, the whole point of compensation is
to undo the consequences of a wrongful act.
Although as applied in tort law the dispute between Weinrib and
Coleman will make a difference in only a small number of cases, some of
those cases are quite telling for our purposes here. Since contract law,
unlike most of tort law, has a strict-liability standard, it will be useful to see
how the two competing visions of corrective justice differ in their views of
strict liability in tort. Because Weinrib's theory requires wrongdoing as a
necessary condition for the imposition of tort liability, he is obligated either
to reject strict-liability doctrine or to argue that it covertly invokes notions
of fault. For example, he justifies the rule of strict liability for injuries that
are the result of ultrahazardous activities in this way. 4 1 Weinrib argues that
when one engages in an activity like blasting, we hold him responsible for
the harms he causes regardless of how careful he was because the activity
itself is so dangerous. But in some cases injurers are held to a strict-liability

36. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain 35-56 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151
(1973).
37. See generally Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2.
38. Id. at 63-66.
39. Id. at 144; see also id. at 142-44.
40. See Weinrib, Non-RelationalRelationships,supra note 10.
41. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 187-90.
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standard even though it is implausible to suppose they have acted
wrongfully. Since such cases most closely parallel the structure of how the
common law treats breaches of contract, it will be useful for our purposes to
contrast how they are treated by the two competing theories of corrective
justice.
The most famous example of a tort case where a court explicitly held an
innocent injurer liable is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 42 In
Vincent, the Reynolds, a steamship owned by the defendants, was moored
43
to the plaintiffs dock for the unloading of goods when a storm struck.
Rather than attempting to sail away, the captain of the Reynolds elected to
remain moored, and the crew even replaced lines holding the ship fast to the
dock as they became worn or frayed. 44 During the storm, the ship caused
five hundred dollars worth of damage to the dock. The court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the defendants had acted negligently in staying
moored. 4 5 On the contrary, the court held that "those in charge of [the
Reynolds] exercised good judgment and prudent seamanship." 4 6 However,
it also rejected the defendant's argument that its lack of negligence shielded
it from liability for damage to the dock:
Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt, take
what is necessary to sustain life; but it could hardly be said that the
obligation would not be upon such a person to pay the value of the
property so taken when he became able to do so. And so public necessity,
in times of war or peace, may require the taking of private property for
public purposes;
but under our system of jurisprudence compensation
47
must be made.
Despite the lack of wrongdoing, the court held the defendant liable for the
48
damages that its actions caused.
Under Coleman's view of corrective justice, the reasoning makes sense.
First, the court distinguished the loss as wrongful since it was due to the
defendant's action, as opposed to a situation where the ship, unmoored, was
thrown up against the dock, or a situation where the lines became undone
(without negligence) and the Reynolds drifted into another ship. 49 In those
cases, the loss would simply be "attributed to [an] act of God" rather than
50
an action by the defendant, and the defendant would not be liable.
Although the loss was "wrongful" in that the defendant's conduct did in
fact cause a violation of the plaintiffs property rights, the action was
justified by necessity and was therefore not a case of wrongdoing. Under

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 222.
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Coleman's account, this apparent contradiction is no contradiction at all.
For him, corrective justice is concerned only with compensating for
wrongful losses. This loss was wrongful since it was the result of a
violation (in this case, an intentional violation) of the plaintiffs property
rights. And the defendant is responsible for the wrongful loss since its
agents caused the loss. Whether the defendant's agents were justified in so
causing the loss may matter when we are interested in making moral
judgments, but since in Coleman's
view that is not the point of corrective
51
justice, it does not matter here.
For Weinrib, this explanation clearly will not do. He argues that the case
is not a matter of corrective justice at all, but rather one of unjust
enrichment. 52 While Coleman is almost certainly too dismissive of the idea
53
that the case could be explained by principles of unjust enrichment,
54
Weinrib's complex argument for unjust enrichment is problematic.
51. The dissent in Vincent argued that because the plaintiff and defendant were in privity
of contract, the plaintiff should have been required to bear the losses due to the storm so long
as the defendant was not negligent. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). To simplify matters, thought
experiments are often used to get around such worries, such as a case where a starving hiker
breaks into a cabin and steals food to save his life. Coleman appeals to such examples.
Coleman, supra note 23, at 332, 372. Weinrib acknowledges them as valid substitutes.
Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 198 n.66.
52. See Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 196-203.
53. Coleman dismisses unjust enrichment as an explanation on the grounds that although
the plaintiff was enriched by the contract, since he was guilty of no wrongdoing his
enrichment could not be called unjust. He states,
There is no denying that injurers in cases like Vincent ... gain as a result of
infringing the rights of others. But the gain is the result of conduct that is
justifiable or permissible. In wronging the victim, [the] "injurer" does the right
thing. His gains are therefore justifiable ones. He is enriched by his conduct, but
not wrongfully or unjustifiably so.
Coleman, supra note 23, at 372. This point is fine as far as it goes, but as Weinrib points
out, not all unjust enrichment cases are based on wrongdoing by the defendant. For
example, if the defendant has only passively received a benefit intended for the plaintiff (for
instance, due to a mistaken delivery) she will be considered unjustly enriched and must
disgorge that benefit to the plaintiff. See Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at
140-42.
54. Weinrib offers a sophisticated argument that includes the unsteady premise that
Kantian right requires that preservation of property trumps use of property, with the result
that, "[e]veryone's property is, as it were, encumbered by the servitude of being available for
use to preserve someone else's property," Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at
201, but only so far as the value of the property preserved exceeds the value of the property
used to preserve it. The value requirement, he maintains, is entailed by the requirements of
respect for others as ends in themselves: Respecting others requires respecting their
ownership rights. Such respect does not entail that we never violate those rights, but that we
do so only in order to preserve property more valuable than what we destroy. Id. at 196-203.
Even if this argument successfully provides a general explanation for what Weinrib calls
"the incomplete privilege of using another's property to preserve one's own," id. at 196, it
fails to explain Vincent. According to Weinrib, the owners of the Reynolds were unjustly
enriched through the use of the dock. Id. at 198. He is right to point out that the enrichment
could not have been through the value of the boat that was saved, since the boat could have
been destroyed and its owners still would have been liable for the damage to the dock. Id.
But if the enrichment were in the use of the dock, the proper measure of damages would be
the value of a license to use the dock for the given time period, perhaps taking into account
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Debates about unjust enrichment notwithstanding, Vincent is in many ways
structurally similar to a breach-of-contract case once one accepts the idea
that a breach of even an executory contract can result in a wrongful loss by
the non-breaching party because the promisor's failure to perform denies
the non-breaching party something to which it is entitled. Just as the
plaintiff in Vincent had a right to the exclusive use and control of his dock,
so too does a promisee have a right to performance. When the promisor
denies the promisee that to which she is entitled under the contract, the
promisor must compensate the promisee for the loss of that entitlement,
even if every aspect of the promisor's conduct was justifiable.
Furthermore, the promisor must do so even if he was morally justified in his
failure to perform.
It is worth emphasizing that although this dispute only extends to a small
subset of cases in tort law, it points to a fundamental disagreement about
the very nature of corrective justice. For Coleman, corrective justice is not
about correcting wrongdoing at all. As Coleman put it, "Annulling moral
wrongs is a matter of justice: retributive, not corrective, justice. There is a
legal institution that, in some accounts anyway, is designed to do retributive
' '55
justice, namely, punishment.
Weinrib's fully relational view, on the other hand, seeks to repair wrongs
by undoing the consequences of those wrongs. Coleman 56 and Stephen
Perry 57 criticize Weinrib's theory for failing to do exactly what it claims to
be doing. They argue that correcting a wrong and compensating for a loss
are two different things and that Weinrib fails to establish that
compensating for a loss is either necessary or sufficient for correcting
wrongdoing. Whether or not this criticism of Weinrib is valid in the
context of tort law, it highlights a particular difficulty Weinrib faces in
contract law. Since contract law does not even require wrongdoing to
establish liability in cases of breach, corrective justice cannot be primarily
concerned with correcting moral wrongdoing by undoing the consequences
of morally wrongful acts if it is to explain contract law. Often in breach-ofcontract cases there will be no wrongful acts at all. Therefore, if contract
law is a matter of corrective justice, it must be so because it seeks to
allocate wrongful losses in the way that Coleman described corrective
justice in tort law.
Seeing the dispute this way sheds new light on the nascent debates about
corrective justice and contract law. As Fuller and Perdue pointed out, it is
not immediately obvious how expectation damages could be compensatory,
and therefore it is understandable that corrective-justice theorists of contract

the circumstances of the storm. Presumably if the Reynolds had been licensed to use the
dock and had not been negligent, its owners would not have been liable for the damages at
all. But in this case, the court measured damages to the dock as if it were a typical tort case.
55. Coleman, supra note 23, at 325.
56. See id. at 323-24.
57. Perry, supra note 25, at 478-88.
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have focused on this problem. 58 It is also thus not surprising that Coleman,
who thinks that corrective justice is first and foremost about allocating
losses, would not offer a corrective-justice account of contract law. Even
though unfulfilled entitlements are not as tangible as the injured bodies and
damaged physical property that litter the landscape of tort law, and even
though it is easy to understand how corrective-justice theorists of contract
have thus far overlooked the need to explain contract's indifference to
wrongdoing, we usually think of breached contracts as broken promises,
and therefore as wrongs. Nonetheless, contract law has to explain how it is
that breaches create wrongful losses whether or not there is wrongdoing in
the breach. The best explanation is that contract law protects the
entitlements created by contracts and seeks to allocate the frustrations of
those entitlements as the demands of justice dictate. Although that legal
duty is most likely best understood as grounded in the general norm that
promises must be kept, that does not mean that by awarding damages
contract law is judging the promisor's conduct. Indeed, contract law is
generally not concerned with the promisor's conduct after the contract is
formed except insofar as the promisee has not received what she is entitled
to receive under the contract. In fact, if the promisor, out of spite, refuses to
perform but some third-party performs on his behalf, the promisee will have
no cause of action. 59 Coleman's corrective-justice theory of tort law
provides the best structure for explaining this feature of contract law.
In the next two parts, I will move away from abstractions about the
general structure of corrective justice and look to particular contract
doctrines. The structure for which I have argued has to be able to account
for the way nonperformance is treated in actual cases. In particular, it has
to be able to fit coherently with fundamental contract doctrine like the
doctrine of consideration, offer and acceptance, and expectation damages. I
will argue in the next part that the picture of contract law I have been
sketching as a corrective for the frustration of entitlements created through
contracting does explain these and other doctrines in a coherent way. It also
has to be able to explain potentially lingering inquiries into whether or not
the promisor is guilty of wrongdoing by virtue of his failure to perform, an
issue I will address in Part IV.
III. CONTRACT DOCTRINE AND ENTITLEMENT THEORIES

Showing that contract law can be explained by corrective justice despite
contract's strict-liability standard is not enough. We must show that the
solution-explaining contract as a system of compensating for frustrated
58. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
59. This assumes, of course, that the performance due is not particular to the promisor,
such as a musical performance by a particular artist. Such exceptions have to do with the
nature of the entitlement-an entitlement to enjoy a song sung by this particularpersonrather than the nature of the promisor's failure to perform, and therefore do not undermine
the claim that contract law is concerned with the satisfaction of the promisee's entitlement
rather than the promisor's failure to perform. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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entitlements rather than as a response to wrongdoing-is also compatible
with contract doctrine generally. Fully demonstrating such coherence is a
task beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief survey is appropriate. In
this part, I will offer a few examples of its fit. In the next part I will
respond to the most likely doctrinal counterexample and explain why it is
not a counterexample after all.
A. The Doctrines of Considerationand Offer-and-Acceptance
First of all, corrective justice better explains contract's consideration
doctrine than theories based on the morality of promise making. If contract
law were primarily concerned with correcting the wrongdoing associated
with promise breaking, then it would be hard to explain why it largely
ignores gratuitous promises. Indeed, the most comprehensive promisebased theory of contract, offered by Charles Fried, 60 struggles mightily with
the consideration doctrine. 6 1 Fried first dismisses the consideration
doctrine as an objection to his theory because the doctrine is "too internally
inconsistent to offer an alternative at all."'62 Perhaps recognizing that the
consideration doctrine is simply too central to contract law to be so easily
brushed aside, Fried goes on to propose alternative explanations, but
ultimately concludes, remarkably, that
the life of contract is indeed promise, but this conclusion is not exactly a
statement of positive law. There are too many gaps in the common law
enforcement of promises to permit so bold a statement. My conclusion is
rather that the doctrine of consideration offers no coherent alternative
basis
for the force of contracts, while still treating promise as necessary to
63
it.

Rather than give up on his theory that the backbone of contract is the moral
duty to keep one's promises, Fried retreats, at least for the moment, from
giving an account of "positive" law to a complaint that specific contract
doctrine fails to cohere with contract's underlying principles.
It would be better if we could give an account of contract law's
fundamental principles that did not require us to ignore or complain about
so central a doctrine as consideration, and viewing contract as an institution
designed to distribute corrective justice does just that. The promise theory
fails to explain the consideration doctrine because it focuses only on the
actions of the promisor. A law truly based on the morality of promises
would enforce gratuitous promises as well as those where there is
consideration given by the promisee, because from the promisor's point of
view, the moral duty to keep the promise is present in both cases. The
promise theory therefore cannot account for the fact that contract doctrine
looks not just to the promisor, but also to the promisee. The entitlement
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally Fried, supra note 14.
Id. at 28-39.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37-38.
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theory I have been describing, by contrast, starts with the promisee, and
begins with the question of whether the promisee has a legal entitlement.
The consideration doctrine focuses attention on whether the promisee has
given anything up in exchange for the promise that would entitle the
promisee to the promisor's performance in a way that the promisor's own
mere moral obligation would not. The promisor's promise is still
necessary, of course, but only because of its role in creating a legal
entitlement, a relationship between the promisee and promisor.
Peter Benson further explains the essential "bilateral" nature of the
relationship between promisor and promisee in contract. 64 Contract law
requires both offer and acceptance, not just the consent of the promisee
(which could be established by the offer alone). 6 5 Just as in property law,
when the recipient of a gift must in some way accept the gift in order to
make the giver's alienation of property complete, so too in contract law the
acceptance by the promisee of a proposed bargain is necessary in order to
transfer legal entitlements. 66 A theory that focused solely on the moral
obligations of the promisee cannot explain this added requirement.
B. Expectation Damages
The entitlement-based structure of corrective justice also better explains
contract's expectation damages remedy than does a relational view. Under
Weinrib's view, compensation damages are the appropriate remedy in tort
law because, very roughly speaking, undoing the consequences of a
wrongful act comes closest to undoing the act itself.67 But if contract law
were a matter of this form of corrective justice, one would expect the
damages for breach to be a measure of the consequences of that breach-in
other words, one would expect reliance or restitution damages rather than
expectation damages. Instead, contract law measures damages by the
amount of the entitlement created at the time of contracting. The nonbreaching party has a right to be placed in the position she would have been
in had the promisor done what he promised to do. Expectation damages are
based on this entitlement, rather than on undoing the consequences of a
(potentially) wrongful act of breach.
Interestingly, Weinrib himself argues that contracts create entitlements to
68
performance, entitlements based on the notion of Kantian rights.

64. See Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justificationfor Contract,supra note 3, at
296-99.
65. Id. (criticizing Barnett's consent theory of contract, another entitlement theory, for
failing to make this point). For Bamett's theory, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying
text.
66. Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justificationfor Contract, supra note 3, at

296-98; see also Benson, The Philosophy of Property Law, supra note 3, at 759-77
(discussing the requirements of "occupancy" in property law).
67. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 114-42.
68. Id. at 136-40; Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgementas Contract Remedies, supra
note 3, at 65-70.
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Expectation damages compensate for the frustration of those entitlements.
But Weinrib's account is unsatisfying in at least two ways relevant for our
purposes. For one thing, this seems to be a marked shift from his
explanation of remedies in tort law, even though Weinrib claims that the
same theory of corrective justice explains all of private law. 69 When
discussing tort law, Weinrib argued that the appropriate response to the
70
violation of a right is to undo the actual consequences of that violation.
This argument lead to much criticism, 7 1 but suppose Weinrib can answer
these objections. In other words, suppose that the correct response to
wrongdoing really is to undo the actual consequences of that wrongdoing.
If that were so, then one of two things are likely to follow. Either contract
law is not primarily concerned with responding to the wrongdoing of
breach, or else damages would be measured by reliance-i.e., by restoring
to the non-breaching party the consequences of the breach. Since the
default remedy in contract is not reliance but rather expectation damages,
then under Weinrib's view it seems contract law cannot be primarily
concerned with correcting wrongdoing.
Weinrib does argue that in contract the wrongdoing of breach is undone
by "restoring to the promisee the value of the right infringed. '' 72 On
reflection, however, we can see that expectation damages do not restore the
value of the infringed right. When performance is due, the promisee is
indeed entitled to performance (or an equivalent to its value). Yet that is
not to say that she at one point held the value of the performance such that
it can be restored to her. Weinrib notes that the value of performance is
"'something [the plaintiff] never had,' ' 73 but he fails to distinguish between
69. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 18-21.
70. Id. at 114-36.
71. Id. For example, it is not clear why "undoing" the actual, physical consequences of
an act, which after all depend on many contingent circumstances that have nothing to do
with wrongfulness of the act, is the appropriate way to "undo" the wrongdoing in the act
itself. Perry, supra note 25, at 478-88; see also Coleman, supra note 23, at 318-24.
Consequences are often a matter of luck, which means that under the relational view the
same action will warrant huge damage awards in some circumstances while warranting no
damages in other circumstances. If tort law is supposed to address moral wrongdoing, it
would be odd indeed that its response to wrongdoing depends so heavily on factors that have
nothing to do with the moral worthiness of the action. Indeed, in some cases wrongdoing
could lead to a net positive result, which begs the question whether the relational view would
insist that even net positive consequences also be undone in order to address wrongdoing. Id.
at 323 (imagining a case where a taxi driver, taking a fare to the airport, drives negligently,
causing his fare to be hospitalized and thereby missing his flight, which, as it happens,
crashes and kills everyone on board). In short, if we want to address wrongdoing, perhaps
an apology would be a more appropriate response, or a jail sentence, or a fine unrelated to
the actual harm caused. For an account of the problems associated with "moral luck" and
tort law, see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28. John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky
distinguish between the problems caused by what they call "causal luck" and "compliance
luck." The objections to the fully relational view mentioned here center on causal luck.
72. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, supra note 2, at 140.
73. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as ContractRemedies, supra note 3, at 62
(alteration in original) (quoting L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr. (pt. 1), supra note 4, at
56).
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respecting and enforcing rights on the one hand, and restoring value on the
other. 74 The only value a court can restore to a promisee is the value she
has spent, either through restitution or reliance. Such losses are caused by
the promisor's breach, and if we are to address the promisor's breach by
undoing its consequences, that restorative remedy is what we would expect.
By contrast, what a court can and will do in a contract case is enforce her
right to the value of the performance. Weinrib's account of contract
damages is not consistent with his account of tort damages and his general
account of private law, in that his account of contract is focused on
enforcing the legal entitlements at the time of contracting, rather than on
undoing the actual consequences of wrongdoing.
I have already argued at length that contract law is not concerned with
correcting wrongdoing in the first place. Yet despite his emphasis on the
promisee's entitlement to performance, on closer inspection it is clear that
Weinrib is committed to the notion that contract law presupposes that it is
wrong to breach one's promises, and that contract law seeks to address this
particular form of wrongdoing. For Weinrib, the source of the promisor's
duty to give the value of performance is the unjust infringement on the
promisee's right to performance. 7 5 Weinrib notes rather blandly that one
who breaches a contract "does something that is inconsistent with a
plaintiffs right."'7 6 It is clear, however, that Weinrib thinks that the reason
the infringement on the plaintiffs right is unjust is because it is the result of
his breaching the contract, which for Weinrib is presumptively wrongful.
Without wrongdoing, Weinrib argues, one cannot make sense of wrongful
loss. 77
Although he does not mention this when discussing contract
damages directly, Weinrib later asserts (in a discussion of unjust
enrichment) that "corrective justice ... suppos[es] that breach of contract is
78
a wrong."
There are two very different kinds of explanation on the table. Is contract
law best described by corrective justice in the sense that it gives people that
74. For an attempt to explain expectation damages using the framework provided by
Weinrib, see Bridgeman, supra note 3. The explanation depends on Weinrib's controversial,

to say the least, distinction between normative and factual loss. The article argues that such
a distinction may explain how punitive damages could be compensatory, but at the cost of
allowing for the possibility of punitive damages in rare breach-of-contract cases. This is a
possibility Weinrib rejects not only for contract, but even for tort.
75. See Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as ContractRemedies, supra note 3, at

60.
76. Id.
77. See generally Weinrib, Non-RelationalRelationships, supra note 10.
78. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, supra note 3, at 74.

Weinrib makes the point in more forceful terms about the basis of restitution damages:
The basis of disgorgement in such cases is the sentiment that one should not
profit from one's wrong. The sentiment has obvious moral resonance. It treats the
breach of contract as a wrong, that is, as an act that the promisor was morally
obliged not to commit. By striking the gains of contract breach from the hand of
the promisor, disgorgement gives teeth to the long-standing principle that promises
are to be observed (pacta sunt servanda).
Id. at 73.
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which another private individual owes them as a matter of justice? Or is it
the case that the injustice that grounds the plaintiffs recovery must, by
definition, be rooted in the wrongdoing of the defendant, wrongdoing which
is addressed by erasing its consequences? Weinrib seems committed to the
latter. But that leaves him with the trouble of explaining not only contract's
indifference to wrongdoing, which he says nothing about, but also why
undoing the consequences of the wrongdoing (breach) is not the appropriate
response in contract law as he argues it is in tort. The better response is that
contract is not responding to the wrongdoing of breach at all, but instead
simply enforces the promisee's entitlements. Expectation damages, which
do not measure the consequences of breach, confirm that contract law is not
best explained by the desire to correct morally wrongful breaches, but rather
simply gives people that to which their contract entitles them irrespective of
moral judgments about promise keeping.
C. The Alienability of Rights to Performance,and Third-Party
Beneficiaries
In addition to such fundamental doctrines. as consideration and offer and
acceptance, many lesser doctrines point to an entitlement theory of
corrective justice in contract law of the sort I have been describing,
including trends that have developed since the days of classical contract
law. Consider, for example, contract law's stance toward the assignment of
contract rights. Initially the common law refused to recognize the transfer
of choses in action, including contract rights. 79 Today, however, "most
contract rights are freely transferable. '8 0 This is exactly the result we
should expect if the fundamental purpose of contract law is to protect the
promisee's legal entitlements. Rights to performance are analogous to
rights to property. As Justice Holmes said in a well-known case,
But when [the promisor] has incurred a debt, which is property in the
hands of the creditor, it is a different thing to say that as between the
creditor and a third person the debtor can restrain his alienation of that,
although he could not forbid the sale or pledge of other chattels. When a
man sells a horse, what he does, from the point of view of the law, is to
transfer a right, and a right being regarded by the law as a thing, even
though a res incorporalis, it is not8 1illogical to apply the same rule to a debt
that would be applied to a horse.
It is hard to see why a legal system primarily concerned with making
parties fulfill their moral obligations to keep promises would treat the
promisee as the holder of a property, or property-like, right. Allowing such

79. Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 64.

80. Id. § 11.2, at 63. Some are not, for example, those contracts where transfer would
place a special burden or risk on the other party or in some way "materially change" the duty
of the other party. Id. § 11.4, at 79. But these exceptions are easily explained by "a concern
for the justifiable expectations of the obligor when making the contract." Id.
81. Portuguese-Am. Bank of S.F. v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7, 11 (1916).
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transferability is at the least not required by the moral obligation to keep
one's promises, and in fact requiring the promisor to deliver performance to
a stranger may go beyond what the morality of promising would even
allow.
In fact, contract law has moved not just from prohibiting the transfer of
contract rights to allowing the transfer, but has gone further still; until now
many contract rights are freely transferable despite the explicit agreement of
the parties at the time of contracting that they should not be transferable. If
the right to performance is a right to payment, article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) makes that right assignable no matter the
intention of the parties toward assignment at the time of contracting. 82 In
other words, for most kinds of rights to payment, an agreement by the
parties that a right to payment is unassignable, or unassignable without the
obligor's consent, is ineffective. Parties can freely alienate such rights just
as they can most any property right.
Another doctrinal area that supports the notion that contract law is
fundamentally concerned to protect property-like rights to performance is
the treatment of third-party beneficiaries of contracts. Although the rights
of third-party beneficiaries have a checkered history, in the United States it
is now clear that the promisor and promisee can create rights to
performance in third parties "by manifesting an intention to do so." 83 The
third party can sue the promisor for performance despite the fact that the
third party was not the recipient of the promise. 84 Early cases required that
the third party be a creditor beneficiary 85 or at least be a close family
member of the promisee. 86 The rationale seemed to be that third parties
who were made beneficiaries because they were owed money by the
promisee (a creditor beneficiary) or owed some other general duty of care
by the promisee (like the duty one has to take care of one's offspring) had a
strong enough claim in justice to sue for the performance of promises made
82. Article 9 holds as follows:
Except as otherwise provided. .. a term in an agreement between an account
debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person
obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the
creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the
account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment,
perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default,
breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination,
or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
promissory note.
U.C.C. § 9-406(d) (2003). It should be remembered that article 9 applies not just to the sale
of goods, as article 2 does, but generally to the "sale of accounts," id. § 9-109(a)(3),
including most rights "to payment of a monetary obligation." Id. § 9-102(a)(2). For
exceptions, see id. §§ 9-109(d), 9-406(f), 9-407.
83. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 14, Introductory Note, at 438-39 (1981).
84. Farnsworth, supra note 17, §§ 10.2-3, at 7-26.
85. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
86. See, e.g., Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918).
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to satisfy such duties, even if the promise was not made to them directly. 87
The modem rule, however, is not so limited: If the parties
manifest an
88
intent to confer a benefit, then the third party has a claim.
The rule that third parties can bring such claims fits well with the view
for which I have argued, namely that contract law makes more sense as a
system designed to compensate for the frustration of entitlements than as a
system for the correcting of moral wrongdoing. Third-party beneficiaries
are by definition not the recipient of the relevant promises. While a
promisor may owe a duty to the promisee to keep his promise, it is at least
unclear that he owes a duty to a third party not to break a promise made to
the promisee. Even if we assume a Weinribian, fully relational view of
wrongdoing according to which wrongdoing is wrongdoing to an
individual, 89 the wrongdoing of breaking one's promise is a wrongdoing
only to the promisee. It is far from clear how allowing a third party to bring
a claim on that promise would correct the wrongdoing. On the other hand,
if we see contracts as creating entitlements to performance, the picture
becomes clearer. It makes perfect sense for the promisor and promisee to
create an entitlement in a third party if they so desire, and thus transfer to
that third party a right to performance. Enforcing such contracts is merely
the recognition of that right to performance.
Further support for the view of contract rights as property-like comes
from the law's stance toward cases where the promisor and promisee would
like to rescind their agreement making the third party a beneficiary. If the
rights to performance were truly property-like rights transferred at the time
of contracting, we might expect the transfer to be irrevocable without the
consent of the third party. In the early landmark case of Lawrence v. Fox,
the dissent recognized this consequence and, starting from the premise that
a promisee could obviously "countermand" his instructions, reasoned that
third parties were not themselves entitled to sue, but rather that the
promisor's obligation remained in the hands of the promisee. 90 Subsequent
courts have followed suit, and now such rights do become irrevocable by
even the promisee, at least once they have "vested." 9 1 Courts do disagree
as to when they vest, 9 2 but the fact that third parties could get such power at
all is strong support for the view that contract law is concerned with
protecting entitlements transferred through contracting, not correcting
wrongdoing done by the promisor to the promisee.

87. Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 10.2, at 7-11.
88. Id. § 10.3, at 12-15; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981).
89. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
90. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 276 ("[The promisee] had lent the money to the defendant, and
at the same time directed the latter to pay the sum to the plaintiff. This direction he could
countermand, and if he had done so, manifestly the defendant's promise to pay according to
the direction would have ceased to exist.").
91. Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 10.8, at 48.
92. Id.

3034

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Finally, as Coleman pointed out about tort law, contractual obligations
can generally be satisfied by anyone. 93 If private law were a matter of
addressing individual wrongdoing, we would expect that not only would
defendants have a particular duty to make good the plaintiffs loss that no
one else has, but also that only the defendant could do so. Private law debts
may be discharged by anyone, whereas at least some criminal debts (like
jail time) can only be satisfied by the wrongdoer. When one party
wrongfully injures another, giving rise to a tort claim, if a third party
chooses to pay the victim on behalf of the injurer, the victim has no more
claim on the injurer. This suggests that tort law is focused on the victim's
wrongful losses, since once those losses have been made whole the tort
system has nothing else to say about the matter. The same is true for debts
in contract law, except for contracts that are personal in nature. 94 Those
contracts can only be discharged by the promisor because of the nature of
the performance promised, not because of any special emphasis on the
moral wrongfulness of breach in such cases. Even for such personal
contracts, damages for breach could be paid by anyone, and such payment
would end the matter regardless of how wrongful the breach by the
promisor was.
I have been arguing that certain basic doctrines in contract law fit quite
well with the picture of contract law as compatible with corrective justice
that I have been sketching, despite contract's strict-liability standard. Not
all doctrine fits so obviously, however. At first blush, for example, it might
seem that the defense of impossibility or impracticability of performance is
an indirect way of fielding inquiries into the moral justifiability of the
promisor's breach. If that were so, then arguably contract law would not be
entirely a matter of strict liability. And if contract law is not really
committed to strict liability, but instead is interested in whether breaching
parties are in some sense at fault, then contract law may be more
straightforwardly a case of corrective justice. In the next part, I will argue
that these inquiries are not really inquiries into the justifiability of breach,
but rather inquiries into the extent of obligations created by the contract. If
I can explain even the impossibility doctrine as consistent with, and even
supported by, my version of contract law as corrective justice, it will be
powerful evidence that the view is on the right track.
IV. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE

So far I have argued that according to the best interpretation of corrective
justice contract law is primarily concerned with correcting the wrongful
losses of entitlements that were gained through contracting rather than
through correcting the wrongfulness of breach. Those entitlements are
93. See Coleman, supra note 23, at 327.
94. One's duties to perform a contract that is personal in nature--e.g., when a noted
artist is hired to paint a portrait-cannot be delegated without the consent of the promisee.
See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 11.10, at 130.
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primarily determined by the consent of the parties. Since this is so, we
should be able to use this interpretation of corrective justice to make sense
of the way contract law treats nonperformance. In what follows, I shall
consider a particularly vexing type of non-performance: cases in which the
defendant claims impossibility as an excuse. I will argue that the best
interpretation of the impossibility cases is not that courts are excusing
defendants from required performance, but rather that courts are struggling
to find the extent of the entitlement that was transferred at the time of
contracting. The more pressing question in contract law is not whether the
party's nonperformance was excusable or justifiable, but rather whether
performance was required under the circumstances at all.
Although one is generally not excused from performing a contract even
when performance has become impossible, the law does recognize some
exceptions to this rule. Performance will be excused if a subsequent law
makes performance illegal, if the person who is to perform under a personal
services contract dies or becomes disabled, or if the subject matter of
performance is destroyed, for example, when a house to be repaired is
destroyed or when crops or goods are destroyed before delivery. 95 At first
glance, such cases might appear to insert at least a limited fault standard
into the law of contract. If the law allows someone to defend against a
breach-of-contract claim by arguing that performance was truly impossible,
it might be thought that this is so because there really is a fault standard in
contract law after all. Letting someone off the hook when she is unable to
perform implies that when the promisor is able to perform but does not, she
is at fault. The impossibility doctrine, according to this way of thinking, is
a result of the maxim that "ought" implies "can." Invoking that maxim
presupposes the moral claim that if the promisor is able, he ought to
perform, and conversely, when he is unable, he is not required to perform.
A closer look at the exceptions to the pacta sunt servanda principle
shows that courts treat such cases not as cases of breach at all, and therefore
the question of wrongdoing is not even considered. Instead, these cases are
decided by inquiring into the question of under what circumstances the
parties have consented to be bound. Or, to put the point into language that
highlights how these cases are instances of what I have called the best
interpretation of corrective justice, the courts must decide under what
circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to the defendant's performance, such
that a denial of that performance would be a violation of the plaintiffs
rights.
The most famous impossibility case in which the defendant's
nonperformance was excused is Taylor v. Caldwell.96 Taylor involved a
contract for the use of a music hall. When the music hall burned shortly
before the planned performance, the plaintiff, who had been preparing for
the performance for some time, sued the owner for his failure to provide the
95. Id. § 9.5, at 624-32.
96. (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.).
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hall. The court held for the defendant on the grounds that the continued
97
existence of the music hall was an implied condition of the contract.
Since the implied condition failed to occur, the defendant was under no
obligation to perform. He escaped damages not because the impossibility
justified his breach, but rather because the conditions under which the
contract was enforceable did not obtain. The idea of implied conditions
drawn from Taylor was for years used as an explanation for why
performance was or was not excused due to impracticability or
impossibility. 98 The extent, however, to which implied conditions are
meant to be expressions of actual (though unarticulated) intentions of the
parties has been heavily debated. 99 Critics argue that courts should openly
seek a just allocation of losses without trying to divine the parties' "actual"
intentions regarding matters the parties may have never consciously
considered.' 00 More recently, courts have moved away from "fictions"
about the parties' intentions in favor of more general concerns of justice,
until what E. Allen Farnsworth calls a new "synthesis" on the topic has
been formed. 10 1 According to the new synthesis, as stated in the UCC
Article 2, "[nonperformance] is not a breach of... duty under a contract for
sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made .... 102
The Second Restatement adopted similar language:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged,
unless the
03
language of the circumstances indicate the contrary. 1
Farnsworth argued that this "new synthesis is far removed from the
reasoning in Taylor v. Caldwell."10 4 Rather than naively searching for the
intentions of the parties, it is claimed, the new rule more "candidly" seeks
05
the requirements of justice.1
In fact, it is not clear how the shift from talk of implied conditions to talk
of basic assumptions changes anything. It certainly does not suggest a
move to a distribution of losses based on what the court thinks would be
just without regard to what the parties consented to at the time of
bargaining. But to the extent that such language signals a willingness to

97. Id. at 312.
98. James P. Nehf, 14 Corbin On Contracts § 74.18, at 106-09 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,

rev. ed. 2001); Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 9.5, at 627.
99. Nehf, supra note 98, § 74.18, at 107-13.
100. Id. § 74.18, at 108.

101. Id. § 9.5, at 632.
102. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2003).
103. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981).

104. Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 9.6, at 633.
105. Id. § 9.6 at 634.

2007]

STRICT LIABILITY AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

3037

take a broader view of the role of parties' intentions and consent, the shift is
both justified and coheres well with the way I have argued corrective justice
explains contract cases. For example, as Arthur Corbin put it,
Courts must interpret the words and acts of the parties [in cases where
impracticability or impossibility is alleged] to determine their probable
meanings and intentions as expressed to each other. Judges then decide
the legal operation of those words and acts, with the understanding that
this will vary in light of subsequent events and that it is dependent upon
the prevailing mores and expectations of the relevant contracting
community. Through judicial decisions in individual cases, tentative
working rules develop in this area as in others at common law, and they
are continually tested and re-examined in the light of the sources from
which they are drawn: the10customs,
business practices, and prevailing
6
mores of the time and place.
Thus, even if parties never expressly addressed possible events such as
the destruction of the concert hall, the court is justified in ascribing
intentions to the parties for such cases based on the relevant norms and
practices of the community. 10 7 Meanings are not a purely individual
matter. Just as a party is not entitled to keep an intention private and then
claim protection based on that intention later, so too the parties' mutual
agreement will be interpreted in light of relevant customs, norms, and
practices both of the parties and of the community. The Taylor decision
can be justified not as a rewriting of the contract (and subsequent forcing of
new terms onto the losing party), but rather as an interpretation of the
agreement the two parties made. Even Farnsworth, who was hostile to the
implied condition rule of Taylor, recognized that contracts should be
interpreted in light of basic assumptions even though "[the assumption
may be tacit; a party may be said to have an assumption even though the
party is not conscious of alternatives, as one who walks into a room may
10 8
assume that it has a floor without giving thought to the matter."
A good example of this reasoning in action can be found in Justice
Benjamin Cardozo's opinion in CanadianIndustrialAlcohol Co. v. Dunbar
Molasses Co. 109 In that case, the defendant, a distributor, had promised to
deliver 1,500,000 gallons of molasses from a particular sugar refinery to the
plaintiff in shipments spread out over the warm-weather season.1 10 During
the time period of the contract, however, the refinery did not operate at full
capacity and only produced 485,848 gallons, of which the defendant was
able to procure and deliver 344,083 gallons."' The defendant argued that

106. Nehf, supra note 98, § 74.18, at 112.
107. The court may be justified in looking to the norms of both the legal and nonlegal
community, depending, among other things, on the sophistication of the parties. See Barnett,
The Sound of Silence, supra note 3 1,at 885-97.
108. Farnsworth, supra note 17, § 9.6, at 640.
109. 179 N.E. 383 (N.Y. 1932).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 384.
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"its own duty to deliver was proportionate to the refinery's willingness to2
'
supply, and that the duty was discharged when the output was reduced." "1
Cardozo agreed with the way the defendants posed the issue, but disagreed
about which circumstances the duty included.
The inquiry is merely this, whether the continuance of a special group of
circumstances appears from the terms of the contract, interpreted in the
setting of the occasion, to have been a tacit or implied presupposition in
the minds of the contracting parties, conditioning their belief in a
continued obligation.
Accepting that test, we ask ourselves the question: What special group
of circumstances does the defendant lay before us as one of the
presuppositions immanent in its bargain with the plaintiff? The defendant
asks us to assume that a manufacturer, having made a contract with a
middleman for a stock of molasses to be procured from a particular
refinery, would expect the contract to lapse whenever the refiner...
chose to diminish his production, and this is in the face of the
middleman's omission to do anything to charge the refiner to continue.
Business could not be transacted with security or smoothness
if a
113
presumption so unreasonable were at the root of its engagements.
The question is not one of whether the defendant's breach can be excused,
but rather whether the defendant has a duty under these circumstances at all.
The issue is one of interpretation, not of grounds for excuse.
Applying this rule, Cardozo admitted that the defendant's duty would not
extend to situations where the refinery was destroyed, there was a failure of
14
the sugar crop, the intervention of war, or perhaps even labor strikes."
But in this case, the defendant assumed a duty to perform so long as the
refinery was able to perform and could easily have protected against their
reduced output by securing a contract with the refinery binding it to
perform. Had they done so, they could even have made their duty to the
plaintiff contingent on the refinery's fulfilling that contract.1 15 But without
these other circumstances, the most reasonable interpretation of the contract
is that the defendants assumed the duty to perform at least so long as the
refinery was able to produce the molasses because both parties operated
under the assumption at the time of contracting that the refinery would
continue to produce the required amount. Rather than characterizing its
decision as a refusal to excuse the defendant's failure to perform, the court
declined to "import[] into the bargain this aleatory element." 116 No excuse
was needed because the conditions requiring performance occurred.
The lesson from this brief survey of impossibility cases is twofold. First,
although it may seem at first that courts are making moral judgments in

112. Id.

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 385.
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breach-of-contract cases by calling some breaches morally excusable, in
fact courts are doing no such thing. Rather than judging whether a breach is
morally excusable, they are judging whether a breach has occurred at all.
This is consistent with contract law's standard of strict liability. Secondly,
when determining whether there has been a breach, courts look to the extent
of the entitlement created by the mutual consent manifested by the parties.
Rather than deciding these cases based on what happened up until the time
for performance that may or may not have excused performance, courts
look to the most reasonable understanding of what the parties did at the
time of contracting. This approach reinforces the idea that contract law can
be explained as a practice of compensating parties for the entitlements that
they gain through contracting, and not as a way of compensating them for
an arguably tort-like wrongdoing of breach. In short, the impossibility
cases are an example of how contract can be corrective without having a
fault standard.
CONCLUSION

I began by claiming that there is a gap in the corrective-justice literature
on contract. Corrective-justice theories seek to explain private law as
compensation for wrongful losses of some sort, yet contract law does not
seem to be concerned with wrongdoing at all. I have argued that this gap
can be filled so long as we have an appropriate conception of corrective
justice. In particular, corrective justice can explain contract law so long as
it is the sort of corrective justice that recognizes that not all wrongful losses
are the result of wrongdoing.
Contract law is not concerned with
wrongdoing, but that does not mean that its primary aim is not to correct
wrongful losses. We can explain contract law as a system of correcting for
the losses of entitlements that were created through the practice of
contracting, and we can do so without harm to contract's strict-liability
standard.
It is appropriate to reiterate in conclusion the limitations of my present
claim. The argument I have presented here is largely structural, and I have
said virtually nothing about the source of the entitlements created through
contracting. This should not be surprising. Corrective justice is an account
of second-order duties of repair, and it presupposes that there is an
underlying account of the relevant first-order duties. l l 7 One might object
that corrective-justice theory thereby threatens to be trivially true in that it is
arguably compatible with any set of first-order duties, and thus with any
theory of contract law.' 1 8 If so, corrective justice could hardly claim to
117. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach
to Legal Theory 32 (2001).
118. I thank Bob Scott and Richard Craswell for this point. Craswell has raised a similar

objection against autonomy theories, Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and
the Philosophy of Promising,88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989), and now in a recent paper against
entitlement theories in particular. See Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract
Theory Revisited (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 925980, 2006), available at
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explain contract law completely in any meaningful sense. 1 19 But saying
that corrective justice presupposes an underlying theory of first-order duties
does not mean that it is compatible with just any articulation of those
duties. 120 As indicated earlier, I myself am optimistic that consent theories
provide the best account of the content of the underlying obligations
associated with the practice of contracting, and I am also optimistic that
some form of a consent theory is most compatible with the structure of
corrective justice. This, however, is not the place for that argument. My
aim here has been simply to show that despite its indifference to
wrongdoing, contract law is at least as open to a corrective-justice
explanation as tort law.

http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=925980&high=%20default%20rules%20
richard%20craswell. A similar objection was raised long ago by Hans Kelsen against
Aristotle's conception of justice. See Hans Kelsen, Aristotle "sDoctrine of Justice, in What is
Justice? Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans
Kelsen 110, 127 (1957). For a discussion of Kelsen's critique, see Weinrib, The Idea of
Private Law, supra note 2, at 66-68.
119. It is worth noting that this is really an objection against corrective theories in
general. If successful, it likely undermines such theories in tort as well as contract.
120. Coleman, supra note 117, at 32.

